The state cannot “legalize noise”. The Constitutional Court has opened the way to compensation for illegal noise exemptions

Living by the roadside and repeated noise exemptions

Mr and Mrs Dolák live in a family house in Brno-Bosonohy, in close proximity to a Class II road which serves as a parallel route to the D1 motorway. Traffic on this road has been intense for a long time and, according to repeated measurements and court findings, there have been exceedances of the noise limits, especially in the protected outdoor areas of buildings. Traffic noise has thus become a permanent part of their daily lives and, according to the complainants, has significantly affected their quality of life, their peace of mind and their psychological well-being.

The Regional Sanitary Station of the South Moravian Region responded to this situation not by strictly enforcing compliance with the noise limits, but by repeatedly issuing so-called noise exemptions. The first exemption was granted in 2006, followed by another in 2010 and a third, crucial for this case, in April 2016. All of them were issued for several years and allowed the operation of the road even in situations where the noise exceeded the values set by the government regulation.

The institution of noise exemption is an exceptional and temporary instrument under the Public Health Protection Act. Its purpose is to bridge a limited period of time when noise limits cannot be immediately complied with, for example for technical or transport-organisational reasons, and at the same time to create space for taking specific corrective measures. The exemption is not intended to serve the purpose of permanently ‘legalising’ an unlawful situation or to postpone the State’s responsibility for protecting public health.

It is precisely on this point, however, that the administrative courts consider that the health authorities have failed. In 2018, the Regional Court in Brno annulled the 2016 noise exemption as illegal. It accused the health inspectors of resigning to their role as protectors of public health, failing to adequately establish the facts and, by repeatedly issuing exemptions, effectively perpetuating the long-term exceedance of noise limits. This conclusion was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court.

The futile road to compensation in the ordinary courts

After the administrative courts annulled the 2016 noise exemption as illegal, the Doláks turned to the civil courts to claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage. They proceeded under the Act on Liability for Damages Caused by an Unlawful Decision or an Improper Official Procedure. They claimed that the prolonged exposure to excessive noise had led to stress, anxiety, deterioration of their health and a general reduction in their quality of life and therefore sought financial compensation.

However, neither the District Court for Prague 2 nor the Municipal Court in Prague granted them compensation. The key ground was not the contestation of the illegality of the decision of the sanitary station – which was admitted by the courts – but the conclusion that there was no causal link between that decision and the alleged harm. According to the national courts, the noise situation at the applicants’ place of residence had not changed in fact either before the exemption was granted or after it was revoked, and it cannot therefore be concluded that it was the unlawful decision which caused their harm.

The Supreme Court subsequently assessed the spouses’ appeal differently. In relation to the wife, it dismissed it on procedural grounds, thus bringing her claim to a definitive end. In the case of the husband, although it had previously admitted standing, it dismissed his appeal as inadmissible in the subsequent proceedings. That left the whole case in a situation where the courts, while acknowledging the State’s misconduct, had closed off the applicant’s route to any compensation. It was this “dead end” that was subsequently opened up by the Constitutional Court.

Noise as an interference with privacy and home: the human rights dimension of the dispute

It was not until the Constitutional Court took a fundamental turn in the whole case that it looked at the dispute not only through the prism of technical causation, but placed it in the broader framework of the protection of fundamental rights. The focus of its attention was not on the existence of noise as a physical phenomenon per se, but on the question whether prolonged exposure to excess noise could constitute an interference with the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.

The Constitutional Court explicitly referred to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and emphasised that the protection of the home is not limited to its physical integrity. An interference with that right may also consist of noise, vibration or other immissions if they are of such intensity and duration that they objectively prevent an individual from enjoying the normal and quiet enjoyment of his home. It is not necessary to prove specific health damage for the interference to arise; it is sufficient that the noise interferes with the quality of life in the long term.

The Constitutional Court placed particular emphasis on the so-called positive obligations of the State. It is not just a matter of the state setting noise limits and formally establishing a regulatory framework, but of ensuring that they are actually and effectively enforced. If a public authority repeatedly tolerates violations of these limits and uses exemptions in a way that effectively renders the regulation meaningless, it fails to protect the fundamental rights of the persons concerned.

In that context, the Constitutional Court has critically assessed the approach of the general courts, which refused to address the very intensity of the interference with the complainant’s privacy by referring to the absence of a causal link. According to the Constitutional Court, such an interpretation leads to a situation where a fundamental right is declared but not actually protected. The possibility of seeking compensation for the interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s home is part of the effective protection of that right. If that route were closed, protection would remain only theoretical and illusory.

Why the Constitutional Court overturned the decision – and what it means for the future

The Constitutional Court ultimately concluded that not only the administrative authorities but also the general courts had failed in the case under review. It was not that the courts misapplied the individual provisions of the State Liability Act, but the way in which they interpreted its terms. According to the Constitutional Court, they chose an interpretation which ultimately prevented the effective protection of the complainant’s fundamental rights.

The principal criticism was directed at the concept of causation. The general courts interpreted it so restrictively that it became a virtually insurmountable obstacle to any compensation. However, the Constitutional Court emphasised that in situations where the interference with fundamental rights is based on a long-term and systemic failure of the State, causation cannot be assessed mechanistically. The decisive factor is not whether the noise would have disappeared completely but for the unlawful decision, but whether that decision allowed the continuation of the situation which violated the fundamental rights of the person concerned.

The procedure of the Supreme Court, which dismissed the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible, was subject to separate criticism by the Constitutional Court. According to the Constitutional Court, this was an unduly formalistic approach which led to the denial of judicial protection on an issue which had an obvious constitutional dimension. According to the judgment, the Supreme Court had thus failed to deal adequately with the fact that the case went beyond an individual dispute and concerned the general responsibility of the State for the protection of fundamental rights.

The impact of the judgment goes beyond the case of one complainant. The Constitutional Court has sent a clear signal that the State cannot tolerate an unlawful situation for a long time through administrative exceptions and at the same time escape responsibility for its consequences. For the residents living in an excessively noisy environment, the finding means opening up a realistic route to compensation. For the public authorities, it is a warning that the protection of public health and fundamental rights must not remain a mere formal declaration.

Summary

ext describes a case which shows that long-term excessive traffic noise is not just a technical or operational problem, but can constitute a serious interference with fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy and peaceful enjoyment of the home. While the State has the tools to regulate noise, it fails in its protective role when it uses them formally and effectively tolerates an unlawful situation through repeated exceptions. In this context, the Constitutional Court has emphasised that protection against noise must be effective and that the possibility of seeking compensation is an essential part of that protection. The case is thus not just the story of one house by the road, but an important precedent for the obligations of the state towards people exposed to excessive noise pollution for a long time.