Slapping is no longer parenting. How an amendment to family law changes corporal punishment and child support from 2026

How the amendment changes child custody and child support rules from 2026

The amendment makes it clear that the upbringing of a child is to be carried out without the use of corporal punishment, infliction of mental hardship and other humiliating or degrading means. This strengthens the protection of the child’s dignity both in everyday cohabitation and in cases where the court assesses the appropriateness of the parent’s or other carer’s educational methods.

There are also changes in the area of maintenance. The amendment specifies that the court shall not only take into account the actual income of the parent when determining the maintenance, but also the income that the parent could have earned, taking into account his or her education, health, qualifications and realistic opportunities on the labour market. This is not a new principle – taking into account the so-called potential income is a long-established rule in case-law aimed at preventing circumvention of the maintenance obligation. It is therefore not a change in the existing case law, but above all its explicit enshrinement in written law.

The explicit emphasis that the child should have a standard of living essentially comparable to that of the parents is also consistent with the courts’ long-standing interpretative approach and does not constitute a substantive change in their decision-making. It will also now be possible – subject to certain conditions – to assign the maintenance awarded to another person, for example for the purpose of more effective enforcement.

The amendments also include a new power for the Government to set by regulation a higher rate of interest on late payment of maintenance for minor children. The aim of this modification is to increase the incentive to fulfil maintenance obligations in a timely manner, while at the same time better compensating for possible delays in payments.

Prohibition of corporal punishment in law: a change of approach

Physical punishment of children may already be punishable in more serious cases – as a misdemeanour or a criminal offence – but the Civil Code does not yet explicitly say that it does not belong in education. This conclusion has been drawn from general child protection provisions, case law and international obligations, with the prevailing view that certain mild corporal punishment – such as a slap on the hand – is educationally permissible. In practice, however, this has led to a confusing grey area: while a part of society perceived ‘educational spanking’ as acceptable, others considered it completely unacceptable. A clear legal definition was lacking.

This is changing from January 2026. The amendment now explicitly states that part of parental responsibility is the care of the child without the use of corporal punishment, infliction of mental hardship and other degrading forms of treatment. At the same time, the law states that these means always touch the dignity of the child. In other words, if an action affects the dignity of a child, it cannot be considered an acceptable educational measure – even in the form of a one-off physical punishment.

From a legal perspective, this creates a strong framework for assessing inappropriate educational methods. Child welfare authorities, courts and experts will have a clear legal basis for concluding thatrepeated physical punishment or humiliating treatment is contrary to parental responsibility and may warrant intervention – for example, restricting contact, placing the child in the care of the other parent or even limiting parental responsibility.

This does not mean that a single failure will automatically lead to prosecution. Above all, the amendment aims at an overall change of approach – to promote non-violent upbringing. If corporal punishment is brought to the attention – perhaps by a school, a doctor or neighbours – the matter can be dealt with by the OSPOD and, in extreme cases, the court. The purpose is not to criminalise the parents, but to send a clear message: the child is not a “little adult who is allowed to be slapped once in a while”, but a full-fledged human being whose dignity deserves protection.

Where does “strict education” end and humiliating treatment begin? What will the court consider

The fact that the new law explicitly prohibits corporal punishment, infliction of mental hardship and other degrading treatment does not mean that strict discipline is impermissible. A parent can still set boundaries, impose prohibitions, restrict access to technology, insist on domestic duties or supervise who a child associates with. It is not the strictness per se that is decisive, but the way in which the discipline is applied and its impact on the child.

The court will always take into account the particular circumstances. In particular, the nature of the behaviour will be assessed: it is one thing to raise your voice once or ban a computer for a week, another to slap a child repeatedly, physically punish him or her, lock him or her up or systematically humiliate him or her. Even verbal attacks, ridicule, social isolation or intimidation can have a significant impact, even if there is never physical violence.

Intensity and repetition also play a decisive role. A situation that is not handled once and a pattern of behaviour that is repeated over a long period of time are two different things. The age and vulnerability of the child is also considered – what may be disproportionately harsh for an adolescent may completely undermine a young child’s sense of security. The court will also take into account whether the parent had other, more proportionate means at their disposal and whether the ‘punishment’ used was an expression of frustration rather than an educational measure.

The new legislation gives the courts a clearer framework. In edge cases, the key will be whether the child’s dignity is preserved, whether he or she understands the rules and consequences, or whether, on the contrary, he or she is subjected to fear, shame and long-term devaluation. A strict but understandable and respectful upbringing shapes the child. Humiliating treatment breaks it. That is where the court will look for the line.

Child support after the amendment: the child should contribute to the parents’ standard of living, not just survive

Currently, the basic principle is that everyparent has a duty to support his or her child and that the child’s standard of living should be essentially the same as that of the parents. However, the details of what exactly constitutes such a standard of living are largely left to the decision-making practice of the courts. Thus, in some cases, child support covers only the basic needs of the child – i.e. food, housing, clothing – and less about the child actually contributing to the standard of living of the higher-income parent.

The amendment, effective from January 2026, does not overturn this principle, but significantly strengthens it. It emphasises that the child’s standard of living should be the starting point – even more important than simply providing for basic needs. At the same time, it expands the concept of a child’s reasonable needs to include an element of future foreseeable change. In other words, the court should take into account not only current expenses but also how the child’s needs will change, for example, with age and schooling. Thus, maintenance now includes the cost of leisure activities, reasonable cultural activities, camps or the possibility of spending leisure time in a comparable way to a parent. If the parent’s financial circumstances allow, savings for the child may also be included.

An important innovation is also the inclusion of the so-called income potentiality directly in the text of the law. The courts have worked with this principle in the past, but it is now gaining unambiguous support. Thus, the court will not only look at the actual income of the parent, but also at what income he or she could reasonably achieve – taking into account his or her abilities, health, education, experience and the labour market opportunities in the place of residence or employment. Thus, a parent who deliberately reduces his or her income, for example by stopping a business or going on minimum wage without good reason, cannot expect maintenance to be automatically reduced.

Combined with the government’s new power to set a higher interest rate for late payment of maintenance for a minor child, the amendment sends a clear signal: maintenance is not a voluntary contribution, but an obligation. If it is not paid on time, there are financial consequences for the obligated parent. The child is not just supposed to “get by”, but to live at a level that his or her parents – even after the separation – can objectively afford.

Assignment of maintenance claims: how it can newly help with maintenance recovery

One of the most significant, but at the same time most controversial, innovations in the area of maintenance from January 2026 is the possibility to assign maintenance owed to another person. Until now, the entitled parent – most often a single parent – had to recover the maintenance himself or herself: file motions in court, deal with enforcement actions, communicate with the authorities and the debtor. All this often in a difficult life situation, where he or she also provides for the normal running of the household.

It will now be possible to assign the maintenance claim to a third party. This may be a specialised body dedicated to debt recovery, but it may also be a family member or another person who is willing to help. It will only be possible to assign maintenance that has already been awarded by the court and is due – that is, the amounts owed. Future maintenance that has not yet accrued cannot be assigned.

The fee for the assignment must be paid in cleared funds through an account – no cash payments, no vague agreements. The new creditor (assignee) only acquires the claim when the amount is paid in full. The law also protects the original beneficiary – especially when it comes to maintenance for a minor child. Whoever buys the claim bears the full risk of its uncollectibility. The assignee (e.g. a parent) is not liable for this, even if it turns out that the debt did not in fact exist at the time of the assignment, if the assignee could have discovered this. In practice, this means that the person who buys the maintenance cannot reclaim the money from the single parent simply because he or she has failed to recover anything from the debtor.

The only exception to this is in the case of onward assignment – that is, where the new creditor is not a vulnerable person but a professional debt trader. In this case, the protection of the original beneficiary is no longer available.

The moment the assignment fee is paid, the claim passes definitively to the new creditor. The debtor will thus still be obliged to pay the new entity, not the original person. This can be a welcome relief for the parent who has been collecting child support – instead of protracted proceedings, he or she will receive a lump sum (or agreed instalments) and be relieved of another gruelling settlement with the former partner.

At the same time, however, the assignment mechanism for maintenance claims described above has attracted considerable criticism. According to its opponents, the law does not – and cannot – contain sufficient safeguards against abuse. Experience from practice shows that a part of the business environment is able to circumvent any regulation and create a profitable business on its basis. The trade in maintenance claims is particularly risky because it involves people in a difficult life situation, typically single mothers or single parents in need, who can be easy targets for usurers and fraudsters.

Although the law stipulates that a claim can only be assigned for 100 % of its principal, critics argue that this does not in itself prevent circumvention of the purpose of the regulation. An example would be a situation where a company would formally purchase the debt for its full value, but then have the parent pay large sums for “legal services” or “collection analysis”, effectively preventing a portion of the value of the debt from reaching the child at all. Yet such practices cannot be effectively supported by the law.

Higher interest on arrears and practical implications: when it pays to tackle maintenance debts

As late as 2025, if a parent fails to pay child support on time, the other parent can seek not only additional child support but also interest on the arrears. In practice, however, this claim often goes unused – especially for lower amounts owed, parents sometimes resign because they feel that recovery is “not worth it”.

However, from January 2026, the situation may change fundamentally. The new legislation allows the government to set a special, and usually higher, interest rate for child maintenance for minors than that normally applied to other debts. This change has primarily an incentive effect – the longer a parent delays payment, the more expensive the debt will be for them. At the same time, the interest should become a more realistic compensation for the parent who cares for the child and waits for the money.

For caring parents, usually single parents, this means that it pays to proactively address the debt – and as soon as possible. Every month of delay brings not only more child support owed, but also higher interest. And if the government reintroduces a higher rate just for child support, the effect of delay will be even more noticeable. For larger arrears, it is therefore worth explicitly claiming interest on arrears – for example, in a lawsuit or enforcement application – and using it as a tool to put pressure on the debtor.

For parents who have to pay maintenance, the message is the opposite: this is not an expense that can be postponed without consequences. If they find themselves in an objectively difficult situation, it is wiser to apply for a reduction in maintenance or agree a payment plan in good time. Those who let their debt grow may soon find themselves facing a very unpleasant bill – not only in the form of court proceedings, but also because of the rising interest, which will no longer be a token addition but a real financial burden.

Summary

As of 1 January 2026, an amendment to the Civil Code will enter into force, which strengthens the protection of children both in terms of upbringing and maintenance. It is now explicitly stipulated that upbringing should be free from corporal punishment, mental hardship and degrading treatment. This provides a clear legal framework for courts and child welfare authorities to be able to designate physical violence, humiliation or intimidation as unacceptable methods of exercising parental responsibility.

This does not mean that strict discipline as such ends – parents can continue to set rules, impose prohibitions or insist on obligations. What will be decisive is the way in which the education is conducted and whether the child’s dignity is preserved.

In the area of maintenance, the amendment emphasises that the child should have a standard of living commensurate with his or her parents’ means – not only basic provision, but also a normal standard of family life, including leisure activities, experiences or, where the financial situation allows, the accumulation of savings.

Another fundamental change is the enshrinement of the principle that the court should take into account not only the parent’s actual income but also how much he or she could earn, taking into account his or her education, health and the situation on the labour market, when determining maintenance.

Practical innovations include the possibility of assigning a court-awarded maintenance claim to a third party – for example, to an entity specialised in recovery. The law protects both the beneficiary and the child by limiting their liability for any uncollectibility of the debt.

Finally, the government will be able to introduce special, possibly higher, interest on late payment of maintenance for minor children. The aim is to incentivise parents to pay on time, while providing the beneficiary with real compensation if child support payments are not forthcoming.