What the state doesn’t want to punish anymore – and more: changes to criminalisation from 2026

When time doesn’t play in the offender’s favour: extending the statute of limitations in murder

One of the most significant changes in the amendment to the Criminal Code effective from January 2026 is the extension of the statute of limitations for the crime of murder. While the previous legislation set the statute of limitations for criminal liability for the basic facts of murder at fifteen years, this period is now extended to thirty years. In doing so, the State sends a clear signal that for the most serious crimes, the passage of time should not be a de facto shield against criminal liability.

The change responds primarily to the nature of the crime itself. Murder constitutes an irreversible interference with the highest protected value – human life – and there is no remedy for its consequences. The legislator thus emphasises that society’s interest in punishing the perpetrator persists, even after many years, regardless of whether the act has been clarified immediately after its commission.

The development of criminalistics and forensic methods is also an important argument for extending the limitation period. Modern technology, particularly in the field of DNA analysis and digital trace work, makes it possible to identify perpetrators even after several decades. A shorter statute of limitations in such cases could lead to a situation where the perpetrator is detected but can no longer be prosecuted.

The new legislation is thus close to the solutions known from many European countries and confirms the trend of strengthening criminal liability for the most serious crimes. While in other areas the amendment to the Criminal Code limits repression, in the case of murder it clearly states that the principle of “forgetting” has no place here.

Neglect of compulsory maintenance: criminal law only in extreme cases

The amendment to the Criminal Code adopts a completely different approach to the most serious crimes in the case of the crime of neglect of maintenance. Here, the legislator openly proceeds from the recognition that the existing criminal law solutions have often failed to serve their purpose. Despite the high number of convictions, the maintenance debt remained unpaid, the recidivism rate was around 50 per cent for a long time and the offender’s stay in prison usually further aggravated the child’s situation.

The new legislation therefore significantly limits the scope of criminal repression. Criminal liability is now to be taken into account in particular when non-payment of maintenance puts the person entitled, typically a minor child, at risk of distress. Criminal law is thus returning to its role as a last resort to intervene only where other legal instruments fail.

The change is based on a realistic assessment of the impact of punishment. For chronic defaulters, repeated punishment has not had a deterrent effect and further criminal records have often made the offender even less employable. The result was a vicious circle in which debt mounted while the child was left without real protection.

At the same time, the amendment does not mean a resignation of the State to protect beneficiaries. The focus of protection is shifting to civil law and social instruments, in particular through alternative maintenance and more effective enforcement. Criminal law is to intervene only where a child’s basic needs in life are threatened, not as an automatic response to every debt.

Repeat property crime: fewer paragraphs, more room for the court

A significant change in the amendment to the Criminal Code is the abolition of separate repeat offences for selected property crimes. This applies in particular to theft, embezzlement, fraud and other similar offences for which the previous legislation automatically increased the penalties only on the basis of a previous conviction of the offender. This very construction has long been the subject of criticism, both for professional and criminological reasons.

Past practice has shown that a punitive approach based on deterrence has not led to a reduction in recidivism. On the contrary, it has often led to the imposition of unconditional prison sentences even for more minor property crimes, which ultimately increased the burden on the prison system without improving the protection of victims’ property rights. The amendment therefore abandons automatism and shifts the assessment of recidivism back to a case-by-case assessment.

The abolition of the separate recidivism offences also reduces the penal rates, in particular by removing the lower limits. The court is thus not obliged to impose an unconditional sentence simply because the law did not in fact provide for another option. On the contrary, it is given the opportunity to take into account the nature of the previous criminal activity, the time lapse, the personal circumstances of the offender and his current life situation.

The aim of the change is not tolerance of repeated property crime, but a more rational penal response. Recidivism has not disappeared from the assessment of the seriousness of the offence, but it is no longer the sole and automatic reason for a significantly stricter penalty.

Drugs and the reality of practice: the difference between production and processing

A significant, albeit less publicly visible, change is brought about by the amendment to the Criminal Code in the area of so-called drug offences. It responds to a long-standing criticism of judicial practice, which has led to disproportionately harsh penalties for persons who procure and process narcotic or psychotropic substances exclusively for their own use. It was in these cases that the conduct was criminalised as ‘production’, with all the serious criminal consequences.

The new legislation therefore consistently distinguishes between the concepts of production and processing. Only the more technologically or chemically demanding process, which is usually aimed at the distribution or trafficking of drugs, is now to be regarded as production. In contrast, processing, typically the treatment of cultivated plants or mushrooms to a state suitable for consumption for own use, is no longer to automatically give rise to liability for a serious drug offence.

The purpose of this change is not to liberalise drug policy or to resign from the criminalisation of drug crime. The aim is to remove the disproportionate disparity in sentencing whereby persons with no links to the drug market have been sanctioned in a similar way to distributors or large-scale producers. The amendment thus responds to the reality of substance use and seeks to better distinguish socially dangerous behaviour from behaviour that has a primarily health and social dimension.

The changes to drug offences fit in with the overall concept of the amendment: criminal law should intervene where it is really necessary and not substitute other regulatory tools where a punitive approach fails.

Summary: one amendment, two directions

The amendment to the Criminal Code, effective as of January 2026, appears contradictory at first glance: on the one hand, it tightens the punishment of the most serious crimes, while on the other hand it significantly reduces criminal repression in some areas. However, it is precisely in this combination that its basic concept lies. The legislator openly abandons the notion that criminal law should be a universal instrument for solving all social problems and returns to the concept of criminal liability as an exceptional, extreme means.

The toughening of the crime of murder clearly shows where the state sees the line beyond which it cannot retreat. The protection of human life and the possibility of punishing the perpetrator even after a long time has absolute priority. Conversely, for conduct where criminal punishment has long been shown not to lead to desirable outcomes – typically child neglect, drug offences for personal use or repeat property crime – there is a reduction in criminalisation and a strengthening of other legal instruments.

This selective approach does not imply a resignation to holding offenders accountable, but an effort to distinguish between genuinely dangerous conduct and situations where criminal law has tended to exacerbate the problems it was intended to address. The amendment thus emphasises the functionality, proportionality and meaningfulness of criminal repression.

The result is not a ‘softer’ criminal law, but a more targeted one. Punishment should protect the core values of society while not burdening the system where other solutions produce better and fairer results.